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Abstract 
 
The Black-Scholes-Merton formula has been put to widespread use by options traders 
because it provides a means of calculating the theoretically ‘correct’ price of stock 
options.  Traders can therefore see whether the market price of stock options 
undervalues or overvalues them compared with their hypothetical Black-Scholes-
Merton price, before choosing to buy or sell options accordingly.  As a consequence 
of this close relationship between options pricing theory and options pricing practice, 
a strong performativity loop was activated, whereby market prices quickly converged 
on the hypothetical Black-Scholes-Merton prices following the dissemination of the 
formula.  The theory has therefore had significant real-world effects, but how should 
we characterise the initial instinct to derive the theory from a philosophy of science 
perspective?  The two books under review suggest that a Kuhnian reading of the 
advancement of scientific knowledge might well be the most appropriate.  But, on 
closer inspection it becomes clear that the publication of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
formula should not be seen as a Kuhnian moment with paradigm-shaping attributes.  
It is shown that, at most, the formula acts as an important exemplar which, via its use 
in the training of options pricing theorists and options pricing practitioners, reinforces 
the entrenchment of finance theory within the orthodox economics worldview. 
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It is often said by those whose work focuses on the constitutive and causal effects of 
ideas that their aim is to correct the tendency for ideas to be taken insufficiently 
seriously.  The same charge most emphatically cannot be levelled against these two 
excellently researched, articulately written and provocatively argued books.  The 
genealogy of financial economists’ treatment of one idea in particular is central to 
both books: the idea that a mathematically tractable ‘ideal’ price exists for exchange-
traded options, such that an increasingly rigorous and scientific basis for hedging and 
arbitrage practices can be institutionalised across a range of different financial 
markets.  It is this idea which resulted in the celebrated Black-Scholes-Merton 
formula for solving the options pricing problem. 
Both books follow Peter Bernstein’s pioneering lead (1992) in explaining the 
initial intuition underpinning options pricing theory within the history of the evolving 
ideas which revolutionised academic finance in the mid to late twentieth century.  
Perhaps the biggest compliment to be paid in this respect is that both bear direct 
comparison to Bernstein’s seminal contribution in terms of the depth of the analysis 
and the insights they provide.  The emphasis differs in each case, however, from 
Bernstein’s attempt to write a general history of modern finance theory.  On the one 
hand, Perry Mehrling weaves the intellectual biography of arguably the most 
influential of all modern finance theorists, Fischer Black, into Bernstein’s history of 
the field as a whole.  On the other hand, Donald MacKenzie focuses more on the way 
in which the academic ideas became embedded via a performative loop in the day-to-
day operation of financial markets. 
Yet, it would be a mistake to concentrate solely on these differences, because 
the underlying theme of both books is remarkably similar.  That is to emphasise the 
practical effects of modern finance theory and, in general, those effects divide in two.  
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First, the guiding intuition of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula has been turned into 
a largely unquestioned framework of thinking for subsequent generations of finance 
theorists.  It is no exaggeration to say that the solution to the options pricing problem 
has been accepted as the professionalised common-sense of financial economics (e.g., 
Jensen 1978: 95).  Second, the guiding intuition of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula 
is now fully embedded in the trading strategies on which market participants rely in 
order to keep their businesses afloat.  The solution to the options pricing problem has 
also been accepted, pretty much across the board, as the starting point for practitioner 
activity within the market environment (e.g., Derman 2004: 5-8).  No greater 
demonstration that ideas matter could arguably be forthcoming than to be able to 
show that a single solution to a single hypothetical problem has so thoroughly 
penetrated the activities of two such diverse communities as market theorists and 
market traders. 
My point of departure in this review is not to question either the fact or the 
extent of these effects.  Mehrling and MacKenzie make such compelling cases about 
their existence, built on in-depth interview evidence from the relevant communities, 
that I am fully persuaded.  Instead, I intend to ask how best we might conceptualise 
such effects.  In particular, are there traditions in the philosophy of science literature 
which help us to explain how a single idea can displace all previous ways of thinking 
about a problem and become the one accepted intellectual framework for all future 
analyses of that problem? 
There are enough hints in the underlying commentary of both books to suggest 
that the most appropriate place to begin this investigation is Thomas Kuhn’s classic 
study, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970).  Even the title of 
Mehrling’s book highlights the potentially revolutionary nature of the Black-Scholes-
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Merton formula which solved the options pricing problem.  Moreover, the notion of a 
revolution is invoked in a directly analogous manner to Kuhn’s specific usage (ibid: 
92-110), suggesting that the professional instincts of financial economists were 
completely overhauled, never to be the same again (e.g., pp. 10, 14).  MacKenzie is 
more explicit.  He suggests that the fundamental shift which has occurred in modern 
finance theory is most assuredly Kuhnian in both its content and its outcomes.  The 
unveiling of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula is presented as “a Kuhnian moment” 
(p. 139), whilst the options pricing problem which elicited the formula is described as 
“a tantalizingly straightforward ‘normal science’ problem, in the terminology of 
Kuhn” (p. 31). 
Before this characterisation can definitely be adopted, though, it is necessary 
to inquire further about how Kuhn’s precise meaning of ‘scientific revolution’ relates 
to his better known concept of paradigmatic thought, and whether his understanding 
of knowledge formation in general can be transposed from the natural science 
frameworks in which it was first developed to modern finance theory.  As the review 
unfolds, it will become clear that I am tempted to go part way towards accepting the 
Kuhnian characterisation of modern finance theory, but I am also inclined to stop 
short of fully endorsing it, especially in terms of relating the origins of modern 
finance theory’s Kuhnian character specifically to the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem. 
 
 
Paradigms and Modern Finance Theory 
 
Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm undergoes significant reformulation between his earlier 
and his later work.  In its original form, it is a radical challenge to presumptions about 
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scientific rationalism (Anderson, Hughes and Sharrock 1986: 251).  Kuhnian science 
is depicted as an inherently conservative social institution, in which to be treated as a 
legitimate entrant into debates is to accept, largely unreflexively, the existing norms 
of the scientific community (Musgrave 1980: 41-2).  Under pressure from his critics, 
though, Kuhn subsequently backed away from this depiction, concerned that his 
notion of a paradigm invited confusion, due to his propensity to use it to describe 
shifts in the orderly way of thinking of very different scale and impact (Newton-Smith 
1981: 103-4).  Kuhn accepted (1977: 294-5) that his original use of the concept had 
been overly liberal, and he latterly restricted it to just two senses. 
 
1. One was an attempt to preserve the general meaning he was trying to capture 
in his original thesis: this was the uniform effects on cognition which arise in 
the context of socially bounded scientific communities that are controlled 
through the exercise of patronage (Eckberg and Hill 1980: 117-8).  Kuhn came 
to call this a ‘disciplinary matrix’ (1970: 182-5), emphasising that this usage 
referred to the regulated constellation of beliefs which a scientific community 
holds about the appropriate way of doing science. 
2. The other represented a new attempt to focus attention on the pedagogical 
strategies which are deployed in order to filter scientific common-sense down 
from one generation of scientists to another.  Kuhn came to call this 
inculcation of learned intuitions exposure to ‘exemplars’ (1977: 297-8).  He 
emphasised the way in which textbook learning by rote had replaced genuine 
reflection as the means through which trainee scientists develop 
professionalised habits of thought (Barnes 1982: 17-8; Margolis 1993: 7). 
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There are consequently two dimensions to paradigms: one intellectual and the other 
institutional (Hollis 1994: 85-6).  Moreover, Kuhn is clear about how they come 
together in his assertion that (1970: 180): “A paradigm governs, in the first instance, 
not a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners”.  Paradigmatic thought thus 
does nothing to alter what of interest might be seen in the world, but it does affect 
what those who are trained to speak authoritatively about the world will be of a mind 
to look for in it.  Accordingly, paradigms are socially regulated consensus-building 
platforms which provide scientists with the practical instincts to guide their day-to-
day operations (Bird 2000: 67-8).  The paradigm shifts associated with scientific 
revolutions therefore eradicate one expression of systematised common-sense and 
replace it with another.  To allow oneself to become acculturated to the learned 
intuitions of a rival paradigm requires the “adoption of a somewhat different 
‘rationality’ at the metalevel” (McMullin 1993: 65).  Given the leap of faith involved 
in such a shift, Kuhn is adamant (1970: 206) that the historical progression of 
knowledge is governed by something other than a “coherent direction of ontological 
development”.  One disciplinary matrix might therefore replace another, but this will 
be for reasons relating to the social control of scientific communities rather than to 
some supposedly objective standards of science. 
So, how closely do the changes in finance theory documented in the books 
under review correspond to Kuhn’s reworked conception of a paradigm shift?  A 
paradigm shift becomes fully institutionalised at the point at which the exemplars 
which supported the previous disciplinary matrix are replaced.  However, as the initial 
shift takes place at the level of the disciplinary matrix, I focus on this aspect for now, 
whilst leaving for later the discussion of the exemplars which sustain modern finance 
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theory as a professionalised scientific pursuit.  Four points might usefully be made in 
this regard about the disciplinary matrix of modern finance theory. 
 
1. Allowing for Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read’s well-made observation that 
Kuhnian historians of science tend to replay the gestalt switch of paradigmatic 
change more quickly than it occurred in real time (2002: 177), the systematic 
shift in both the procedural and the content basis of finance theory is very 
much as Kuhn attributes to paradigmatic thought.  Prior to Harry Markowitz’s 
seminal work on portfolio selection in the 1950s (e.g., 1959), the starting point 
for finance theory had generally been the firm and its decisions of how best to 
raise the money to fund its business operations.  Fund managers had 
previously incorporated discounted cash flow techniques into their analysis of 
possible investment decisions, but this made very little impact on academic 
theories of finance, which still tended to emphasise the firm.  Markowitz’s 
approach was very different.  He asked instead how individual investors 
should seek to balance their stock portfolios in order to maximise their 
potential returns at any given level of risk.  From that point on, all notable 
advances in finance theory have concentrated on hypothetical issues relating to 
‘the market’ and not practical issues relating to financing the firm (e.g., 
Mehrling, pp. 10, 225-6; MacKenzie, pp. 73-4, 244).  Amongst its 
practitioners, the constellation of beliefs about what it means to be doing 
financial economics is now firmly fixed on this market-based approach to the 
subject matter.  In this way, there is a clear parallel with what Kuhn had in 
mind by the imposition of a new ‘disciplinary matrix’. 
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2. Set directly against this, though, it is unclear whether the development of 
modern finance theory actually represents a new disciplinary matrix or merely 
the transposition of the subject matter of financial economics from one 
discipline to another.  Kuhn is adamant (1970: 180) that a paradigm regulates 
the practitioners of science and not the subject matter on which they work.  
But this image is not necessarily easy to reconcile with developments in 
finance theory.  The watershed moment should once again be seen as 
Markowitz’s work on portfolio selection, because this represents the first time 
that the theories, methods and basic intuitions of economics had been applied 
to finance theory in any systematic manner.  So new was this approach that 
Milton Friedman, one of Markowitz’s examiners, was initially reluctant to 
award Markowitz his economics PhD: not on the grounds of the quality of the 
thesis, but on whether the subject matter was actually economics (Bernstein 
1992: 60).  From Markowitz onwards, what might be seen as a scientific 
revolution in finance theory could also be merely the increasingly pervasive 
encroachment of economists into the subject field of financial markets and 
their eventual displacement of the business school theorists who had once had 
that field to themselves.  MacKenzie (p. 67), for instance, writes that, by the 
late 1960s: “The financial markets had been captured for economics” (see also 
Mehrling, p. 128).  No such dynamic of capture is evident in Kuhn’s 
description of paradigm change and, for this reason, his concept of a 
disciplinary matrix must be applied with caution to modern finance theory.  In 
order to say that a new disciplinary matrix has been created, we would have to 
be able to prove the counterfactual that economists would not have applied 
their standard model of maximising behaviour to financial markets had they 
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shown more interest in the subject matter in the pre-Markowitz era.  This 
seems unlikely; moreover, it is, of course, an untestable proposition. 
 
3. If we suspend our caution on this point for one moment, then we can find 
another element in the evolution of finance theory which fits the notion of a 
disciplinary matrix much more satisfactorily.  As soon as economists began to 
show a professional interest in financial markets, the development of finance 
theory “has something of the character of a cascade” (MacKenzie, p. 243).  
Markowitz’s work was refined further and turned into a fully specified model 
– the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) – by his doctoral student, William 
Sharpe.  Sharpe’s model (e.g., 1970) then became the object of attention for 
the next generation of Chicago-based finance scholars, who tried to find a way 
of solving it in mathematically tractable form.  Both Fischer Black and Myron 
Scholes passed through Chicago en route to MIT and the beginning of the 
collaboration which would result in the solution to the options pricing 
problem.  Also at MIT at that time, Paul Samuelson was developing an 
alternative economic approach to financial markets, and it was his doctoral 
student, Robert Merton, who was able to demonstrate that the Black-Scholes 
solution was mathematically robust.  Scholes and Merton were then prominent 
in supervising the succeeding generation of students who refined finance 
theory still further.  Significantly, as Sharpe, Scholes and Merton had done 
before them, these students also took their supervisors’ starting assumptions – 
along with the learned intuitions which allowed those assumptions to make 
sense – as a given.  More so than any of the other social sciences, economics 
mirrors the natural sciences in the patronage that determines the choice of 
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what to study for young scholars (Eichner 1983: 227-8).  PhD topics are given 
to students by their supervisors and, in this way, supervisors’ habits of thought 
are passed down, often unknowingly, in the process of learning how to be 
accepted amongst the community of economists. 
 
4. However, another word of caution has to be issued in this respect.  It appears 
to be appropriate to think in terms of a disciplinary matrix when discussing the 
structure of modern finance theory.  Yet, according to Kuhn (1977: 297-9), 
disciplinary matrices are forged in a moment of scientific revolution and rely 
for their coherence on a single path-breaking intervention.  It is unclear, 
though, exactly what the foundational intervention is in the creation of the 
disciplinary matrix of modern finance theory.  With his specific focus on the 
life and work of Fischer Black, it is easy to assume for Mehrling that the 
answer is the Black-Scholes-Merton solution to the options pricing problem.  
Moreover, when MacKenzie’s ‘cascade’ of advances in finance theory was at 
its height in the late 1970s, doctoral students learned what financial economics 
was specifically through being trained in the economic intuitions of Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973).  But MacKenzie also describes this work, 
in Kuhnian terms, as being part of a ‘normal science’ tradition (p. 31).  At 
most, then, training through the Black-Scholes-Merton formula enhances the 
process of consensus-consolidation within the community of financial 
economists, rather than being responsible for consensus-creation in the first 
place.  Its publication is not the moment of scientific revolution which 
establishes a paradigm, so much as the model which enables paradigmatic 
thought to be increasingly inculcated as professional common-sense.  So, 
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where might the paradigm-establishing moment of scientific revolution be 
located?  For Mehrling, it is clearly with Sharpe’s CAPM, because this is what 
had the greatest effect on Black.  A wonderfully evocative picture is painted of 
Black as the human embodiment of the CAPM, such was his desire to 
construct not only his academic way of thinking but also his general way of 
living on its insights (pp. 130-1, 138).  Yet, MacKenzie shows that Merton 
consciously rejected the CAPM in his approach to the options pricing 
problem, believing it to be some combination of theoretically old-hat and 
empirically wrong (pp. 134-6).  In Merton’s hands, then, Sharpe’s CAPM had 
just as restricted a shelf-life as Markowitz’s portfolio selection theory, which 
was also very quickly displaced as the starting point for financial economics 
(Bernstein 1992: 201).  As a consequence, the jury must still be out as to 
whether modern finance theory has an instant of scientific revolution and, if it 
does, in which publication that instant is to be found.  This is a poor fit with 
Kuhn’s notion of paradigmatic thought. 
 
The evidence for whether modern finance theory approximates a Kuhnian paradigm 
can therefore be read both ways.  However, up to this point I have concentrated 
exclusively on the ‘disciplinary matrix’ understanding of a paradigm.  It is now 
necessary to turn to the rival ‘exemplar’ understanding, to ask whether the Black-
Scholes-Merton formula is of particular importance in this regard. 
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The Black-Scholes-Merton Theorem as Performative Exemplar 
 
In seeking to illustrate the pedagogical power of exemplars, Kuhn emphasises the 
difference between how the world might look to us in pure observational terms and 
how it looks in theoretical terms (1970: 119-26).  Given that a process of translation 
must always intervene in order to impose meaning on observations, it is the 
theoretical view of the world which is more important (Musgrave 1980: 47).  As 
Sharrock and Read argue in explaining Kuhn’s position (2002: 178): “Our knowledge 
of the world … must always involve two elements: a contribution from the world, and 
a contribution from our minds, with the latter (so to speak) endowing structure upon 
the former”.  The suggestion, then, is of a radical and incommensurable split between 
the ‘external world’ of nature and a plurality of potential ‘phenomenal worlds’ which 
scientific practices first construct and then inhabit.  Particular practices come to 
predominate, not because they offer privileged access to understanding the external 
world, but because they are explicable in their own terms from within the 
paradigmatic thought processes associated with the prevailing phenomenal world 
(Shapere 1980: 29; Hacking 1983: 185). 
As a consequence, the only thing which presents itself for empirical 
investigation is the phenomenal world created by the central tenets of scientific 
orthodoxy; the external world cannot be apprehended in this way (Hoyningen-Huene 
1993: 34-5).  Even then, the phenomenal world is not interrogated as an authentic 
representation of what it might be were it actually the external world.  Rather, all 
understandings of its structure and its content are mediated by scientists’ familiarity 
with standard exemplars, constant interaction with which helps them to visualise the 
phenomenal world in a particular way.  This means that, from a Kuhnian perspective, 
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science is not a matter of comparing theories with nature, so much as comparing 
theories with their own conception of how nature should perform, where that 
conception is learned directly through exposure to exemplars. 
This is where an important distinction must be drawn between Kuhn’s 
conception of science and the world in which modern finance theorists have worked.  
For Kuhn, scientists operate within their own internal phenomenal worlds, and the 
acculturation to a new set of theories only involves a shift between different 
phenomenal worlds.  In turn, this is about changing the interpretation of natural 
phenomena, not changing nature itself.  A different process is implied in the shift 
between different finance theories.  An increasing number of scholars – Mehrling (pp. 
9-14) and MacKenzie (pp. 12-20) amongst them – have pointed to the capacity for 
economic theory to have performative effects on actual economic relations (e.g., 
Miller 1998: 195-9; Breslau 2003: 384-5; Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton 2005: 13-4).  In 
other words, incorporating the implications of economic theory into economic 
practice creates an economy which increasingly comes to resemble the relationships 
inferred by the theory. 
This is where the significance of the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem is really 
revealed.  For, the strongest evidence of performativity in modern finance theory 
involves the theorem and its use as an exemplar for training interested parties in the 
art of calculating the ‘true value’ of an options contract.  Treating the theorem as the 
key exemplar which unlocks the phenomenal world of modern finance enables traders 
to work out whether the prevailing market price of an option means that it is currently 
overvalued or undervalued.  It does so by providing unique insights into the 
‘equilibrium’ price which equates to a smoothly functioning and distortion-free 
market.  Strong performativity was signalled by the speed with which market prices 
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converged on the Black-Scholes-Merton price (Mehrling, pp. 139, 249; MacKenzie, 
pp. 32, 37-8, 166). 
The first fully-fledged exchange for trading options on financial assets was 
only established in April 1973.  At that time, traders were unused to constructing 
deals containing options on financial instruments, so they based their decisions on ad 
hoc trading rules derived from specialist trading in other markets.  Later in 1973, 
though, the academic journal articles which underpinned the Black-Scholes-Merton 
theorem appeared (Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973).  These articles provided a 
formal specification of a mathematically tractable guide to equilibrium options pricing 
and, as such, they served as the basis for an easily understandable trading rule.  The 
result was that the theorem came to be readily incorporated into the institutional fabric 
of financial options markets.  In the stock options market, for example, the average 
market price premium fell from around a 30% mark-up on the equilibrium Black-
Scholes-Merton price when exchange-traded options first became available in 1973 to 
an astonishingly small mark-up of 2% in 1978 and then again to a mark-up of only 
1% immediately before the destabilising shock of the 1987 stock market crash 
(Rubinstein 1994: 774; MacKenzie, pp. 158-77).  This shows that traders were willing 
to base their investment decisions, not on the grounds of any great intuition about how 
the world actually works, but on the grounds of how options pricing theory said it 
should work.  In the process, traders’ activities served to confirm in practice the 
insights of options pricing theory. 
This outcome was all the more noteworthy given that, at the time of its initial 
publication, it was impossible to enter the world of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
theorem in order to act upon its implications.  The theorem relates merely to one of 
Kuhn’s phenomenal worlds, but the multiple restrictions on trading activities designed 
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to protect investors from exposure to a pure market mentality meant that the world 
which options traders actually inhabited was markedly different.  Equilibrium only 
arises in the theorem’s phenomenal world when no arbitrage opportunities remain and 
consequently prices are stable (Derman 2004: 6-8).  The Black-Scholes-Merton 
theorem therefore had the potential for strong performativity right from its inception, 
because the central mechanism in the phenomenal world, arbitrage, is also the central 
component of trading practice.  However, the practicalities of market trading did not 
initially match the potential for performativity.  Financial options arbitrage initially 
took place within tightly circumscribed moral, legal and institutional limits, due to 
residual fears expressed by policy-makers that trading in financial futures was a 
sophisticated form of gambling rather than an act of real economic worth (de Goede 
2004: 201).  Very quickly, though, the performative potential of the theorem was 
released.  Its promise to reduce investors’ risk exposures was particularly important in 
softening regulators’ reluctance to endorse options trading which conformed to pure 
market principles.  Following a whole series of regulatory relaxations, the world 
inhabited by options traders increasingly came to resemble the phenomenal world of 
the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem. 
But let us backtrack for a moment, to focus once again on the origins of the 
formula which solved the options pricing problem.  The basic argument underscoring 
the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem had been given many outings at academic 
seminars before it was physically possible to deal in exchange-traded options in 
financial instruments (Bernstein 1992: 220-2).  In its original form, then, the theorem 
was little more than a thought experiment.  However, this makes it no less significant.  
Indeed, in his later work, Kuhn asks whether the ability to facilitate highly 
consequential thought experiments was potentially the most important feature of a 
 16 
paradigm.  At the very least, a well-constructed thought experiment provides an 
internal check on how robust a paradigm’s major arguments are. 
Kuhn is insistent (1981: 7, emphases in original) that “the new understanding 
produced by thought experiments is not an understanding of nature but rather of the 
scientist’s conceptual apparatus”.  Thought experiments can only be tested in the first 
instance as a matter of logic, and it is the prevailing paradigm which imparts 
analytical meaning onto the logical sequences which thought experiments highlight.  
Thought experiments therefore take place within the context of an existing paradigm; 
they have an affirmatory intent in relation to the internal structure of the paradigm 
rather than possessing paradigm-creating features of their own.  In Kuhn’s words 
(ibid: 14), they are “a propaedeutic to the full discussion”.  This means that they act in 
a preparatory sense to facilitate understanding of the introductory premises of a 
science, as opposed to being constitutive of science in their own right.  From this 
perspective, the initial derivation of the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem, its easy 
acceptance as the common-sense of both academic theorists and market practitioners 
and the strong performativity of its application are all evidence of its 
commensurability with existing paradigmatic thought in the field of economics. 
The theorem today is used as such a key exemplar for finance theory that it 
provides significant impetus for the reproduction of the disciplinary matrix within 
which financial economists work.  But this tells us only about the evolution of its 
status from its original role as a thought experiment.  In that initial form, the Black-
Scholes-Merton theorem was merely a means of testing whether the prevailing 
disciplinary matrix of financial economics was robust.  The outcomes of the test had a 
curious effect insofar as they were able to become increasingly true over time due to 
the performativity loop the theorem initiated via its incorporation into trading 
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strategies.  Yet, it was only the fact that the test proved positive in the first place 
which allowed the theorem to subsequently become such a significant exemplar for 
training new generations of financial economists into the habits of thought of the 
prevailing disciplinary matrix.  It was not an exemplar in its original form, as the 
institutional capacity was simply not present at the time of its initial publication for it 
to act in that capacity.  It only latterly acquired the potential to be used as an 
exemplar. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum up, this brings me back to the main question underpinning the review.  There 
is ample evidence of Kuhnian themes in the intellectual history of modern finance 
theory, as the work of Mehrling and MacKenzie readily demonstrates.  However, is 
there a definitive Kuhnian moment giving both clarity and direction to this process?  
Given that the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem has had more practical effects on 
investor behaviour than any other aspect of modern finance theory, it is 
understandable that Mehrling and MacKenzie focus so much of their search for an 
answer to that question on the theorem’s origins.  But its clear status originally as a 
thought experiment suggests that, if we are to apply Kuhn’s framework in as authentic 
a manner as possible, then it can be no more than what he calls ‘a propaedeutic to the 
full discussion’.  So, if the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem is merely a propaedeutic 
the question remains as to what, exactly, constitutes the full discussion? 
To answer this, it may well be necessary to conclude that the most important 
factors determining the practice of modern finance theory are not to be found in the 
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realm of finance theory itself.  The most distinctive feature of that theory is that it no 
longer constitutes an autonomous body of work in its own right.  The standard 
procedure of finance theory is now to conceptualise every analytical problem as if the 
only practical task was to devise market institutions for coordinating behaviour in line 
with the allocatively efficient solution.  As such, finance theory today explores the 
logical properties of equilibrium behaviour in the buying and selling of financial 
instruments and, in this respect, it is indistinguishable from any other branch of 
economics in terms of its underlying methodology.  The dramatic shift in finance 
theory in the second half of the twentieth century, so ably documented by Mehrling 
and MacKenzie, at heart was a shift in what it meant to be a finance theorist.  It is the 
story of the encroachment of economists into a previously alien subject field and their 
speedy appropriation of it.  Thus, the search for a Kuhnian moment in modern finance 
theory involves explaining the increasing colonisation of other research traditions by 
the economics worldview. 
In and of itself, the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem was neither constitutive of 
the disciplinary matrix which guides the intuitions of modern finance theorists nor 
was it the original exemplar which confirmed the shift in finance theory in line with 
the economics worldview.  It therefore had nothing to do with whatever organic 
Kuhnian moment historians of finance theory subsequently want to read back in to its 
modern-day practices.  Yet, the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem has still had Kuhnian 
effects, even if it is to enforce a misplaced chronology onto modern finance theory to 
talk about it initiating a paradigm shift in academic approaches to financial questions.  
It was without doubt the most important thought experiment assisting the process of 
institutionalising the new habits of thought which persist up to this day in finance 
theory.  Indeed, so successful was it in demonstrating that the economics worldview 
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provides a robust logical basis for finance theory that it now acts as the key exemplar 
securing the reproduction of the new disciplinary matrix.  Despite its significance in 
this respect, though, the Kuhnian chronology must still appear in the correct order: the 
paradigm shift in finance theory came first, and the development of the Black-
Scholes-Merton theorem followed as a reflection of the move to a new disciplinary 
matrix, not the other way around. 
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